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BACKGROUND
For the first time, the President of the European Commission will be elected by the European Parliament (EP) on a proposal
made by the European Council taking into account the outcome of the EP elections. In this context, European political
parties chose to put forward 'top candidates' at EU level campaigning for this job, simultaneously with the candidates
competing, at national level, for seats in the future European Parliament. 
Throughout the campaigns at national and EU level, migration is among the main issues addressed and has some potential
to determine the outcome of the elections. The economic, financial, social and identity crisis in addition to the rise of
populism have provided a backdrop for migration to come to the foreground. This, together with concerns expressed in
some Member States on issues like demography and labour force shortages, has laid the groundwork for thought-
provoking and heated debates on migration. This policy brief seeks to analyse the content of the arguments brought
forward at national and EU level and their potential to influence the Union's future political agenda. 
Without any pretence of exhaustive analysis, this paper focuses on how EU immigration policy and free movement of EU
citizens are discussed in the three biggest EU Member States where these issues have fuelled high tensions in recent years:
France, Germany and the United Kingdom. It is worth highlighting, these topics are debated in different terms and from
different perspectives in other EU Member States. Nevertheless, the choice of these three is motivated by their capacity to
influence the evolution or involution of the EU's immigration and free movement policies in the next political cycle. 
Regarding the EU level, the paper examines how these policies are debated between the four aspirants for the
Commission's Presidency who have participated in several debates: Jean-Claude Juncker (EPP), Ska Keller (Greens), Martin
Schulz (PES) and Guy Verhofstadt (ALDE).
This paper will focus on the following key issues: external border controls, legal migration, intra-EU solidarity in the field
of immigration, the Schengen area and the so-called 'benefits tourism'. This will help identify the possible priorities and
trends on the future European immigration and free movement agenda.
From the analysis, it is clear that two different campaigns are unfolding with respect to these two policies. The tense
domestic debate in Germany, France and the United Kingdom is not uploaded to the EU level, where instead we are
witnessing a rather serene 'confrontation'. Therefore, several questions deserve particular attention: What impact will this
have on tomorrow's immigration and free movement agenda? How will this influence the development of these policies?
What will the consequences be, if any, in institutional terms?
STATE OF PLAY: the disconnection between two debates
An unbalanced debate at national level: from an aggressive tone to muteness 
In the three abovementioned countries – but not exclusively – immigration and freedom of movement are intensely
debated and create great anxiety. Although discussed together at domestic level, these two policies are fundamentally
different. The freedom of movement is a fundamental right granted to EU citizens whereas the immigration policy defines
rules regarding entry, residence and movement of third country nationals to and within the EU.
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National parties have put forward different political programmes which can help us anticipate the trends among which
debates in the future EP might take place in terms of immigration and free movement. These issues are likely to be 'hot
topics' for the next European political cycle, therefore it is important to pay attention to how they are currently being
approached at national level. 
Some parties chose to play the 'aggressive card'. Ultranationalist parties such as UKIP (UK) and Front National (France)
have put the generic 'migrant' – no distinction between mobile EU citizens and third country nationals – at the centre
of their campaign, wrongly mixing up the two categories in doing so. In any case, their focal points are different. 
UKIP aims to end the 'social welfare tourism' of EU citizens moving to the UK. The Front National's goal is to stop
"both legal and clandestine immigration" and to revise the Schengen agreement in order to "regain control" over
French borders.
A milder tone can be found amongst some mainstream political parties which have decided to bet on the 'reduce
immigration card'. Their agendas concentrate on different concrete issues, but have three more or less common,
elements. First, as the parties mentioned above, they mix issues of free movement and immigration. The Bavarian
Christian Social Union (CSU), the British Conservatives and German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) intend 
to reform the free movement rules in order to – as they put it – limit migrants' access to social benefits. Second, 
some envisage a revision of the Schengen rules. The French Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) wants
sanctioning, suspending or even excluding a 'failing' Member State from the Schengen area to be possible. Moreover,
the UMP wishes to suspend France's participation in the Schengen area within 12 months if "substantial progress"
is not made. Third, in terms of immigration, UMP and AfD talk about controlling immigration by strengthening 
border controls. 
The 'shy stance on immigration and/or free movement card' is played by the German Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) and Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), the British Labour Party and Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems)
and the French Socialists, although there are some differences worth mentioning. As for the freedom of movement, the
French Socialists timidly invoke it only in relation to workers. Their objective is to fight social dumping which is also a
priority on the SPD and Labour Party agendas. In this vein, the two parties want to press for stronger controls in Europe.
The benefits of free movement are however pointed out in the Lib Dem agenda, together with the commitment to fight
the abuse of the British social system. These parties are nevertheless a bit bolder on immigration. The French Socialists
want to boost development aid and enhance intra-EU solidarity to assist Mediterranean countries. Development aid
for origin and transit countries is also put forward by the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The same goes
for Germany's SPD which also highlights the need for a system of legal migration. 
Finally, the 'some things are better left unsaid card' has been put forward by the British Lib Dems and Labour Party in
terms of immigration (not freedom of movement). The immigration policy is not mentioned in the Lib Dem manifesto.
Although it has a chapter entitled "immigration that works for Britain" in its manifesto, a thorough analysis of the
Labour Party's programme shows it is mainly – if not exclusively – composed of free movement policy proposals. 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, immigration and freedom of movement are – with some
exceptions (ex: British Lib Dems, French Socialists, German SPD) – debated together. It cannot be stressed enough that
blurred lines and forced overlapping of dossiers could lead to instilling the idea of EU citizens as immigrants and
envisaging a restriction of the rights they enjoy. Considering that free movement is perceived by EU citizens as one of
the biggest EU achievements, this distortion and its possible consequences are particularly dangerous for the future of
the European project.
Second, some mainstream parties have borrowed populist arguments creating an imbalance between, on the one side,
arguments depicting migrants as a burden for the host society, speeches on revising the Schengen rules and
strengthening external border controls and, on the other, a hesitation to highlight the benefits of migration. This is not
very surprising. After all, politicians are elected by voters and migrants are not part of the electorate (for EP elections)
with the exception of the UK for some specific third country nationals. In addition, mobile EU citizens, who do have a
right to vote in EP elections, represent a very small share of people and, consequently, voters.
Finally, although competing in European elections, the political agendas of national parties are also characterised by
fundamentally different objectives due to different social, economic and political situations that impact the way
immigration and free movement is addressed. 
At the EU level: a mild debate 
For the four 'top candidates' who have participated in several public debates – Jean-Claude Juncker, Ska Keller, Martin
Schulz and Guy Verhofstadt – immigration and free movement are less controversial and have been less arduously and
 
extensively debated than subjects like: youth unemployment, austerity or the crisis in Ukraine and energy dependence
on Russia. Furthermore, they bring forward other policy elements – sometimes different than the trends identified at
national level – which might also be priorities on tomorrow's EU immigration and free movement agenda.
Immigration is not the item which distinguishes the four agendas although it receives different attention from candidate
to candidate. Verhofstadt speaks of the need for "a legal common immigration policy" without detailing it. Keller
mentions a switch from a "Europe which sees migrants as a security threat" to "an open Europe that cares for people in
need". Juncker presented a five-point plan on immigration: implementing the Common European Asylum System,
boosting the role of the European Asylum System Office, cooperating with third countries, encouraging legal migration
and tightening the control of EU borders. Schulz talks about temporary protection, intra-EU solidarity, cooperation with
transit and origin countries and a system of legal migration. 
From the debates between the top candidates, two common elements can be identified. The first one is the need for
more legal migration channels. Yet, the motivations of the four candidates vary. Verhofstadt portrays legal migration as a
way to cope with irregular migration. Keller depicts it as a way of preventing people from resorting to dangerous
journeys towards the EU. Although similar, these two positions differ because they emerge from opposite angles. If
Verhofstadt approaches this issue from the point of view of the EU, Keller looks at it from the migrants' perspective.
Schulz claims that migrants could contribute to fighting the consequences of an ageing European population. Juncker
also stresses the fact that the EU law should be revised in order to favour legal migration. 
The four candidates agree on one point: legal migration can be a growth factor for the EU by addressing the labour
market shortages which cannot be fulfilled by the labour force inside the EU. However, no candidate brought up the
'need for innovation' argument even though the 'innovation union' is one of the Europe 2020 flagship initiatives and
academics (Venturini and Sinha) have shown that migrants play a positive role in promoting innovation.
The second common element among the four candidates is the need to boost intra-EU solidarity in the field of
immigration. However, once again, their views have different nuances. Juncker wants EU Member States to show more
solidarity in supporting the costs of the return policy to reduce the burden that weighs on the EU Mediterranean
countries, but he also specifies that Member States should no longer reduce their development aid budgets. Schulz
envisages a temporary protection system, which should enable the EU to grant protection to people fleeing conflicts in
their home countries. Keller points to EU’s shameful performance in offering protection to Syrian refugees, so she wants
EU Member States to engage more into resettlement programmes. Verhofstadt pleads for "burden sharing for the people
in need".
A distinction can be noticed between those in favour of more protection (Keller, Schulz, Verhofstadt) and Juncker as a
supporter of the return policy. 
To sum up, legal migration and intra-EU solidarity are addressed at EU level while quasi absent from the national debate
in France, Germany and UK. 
Regarding the freedom of movement, the controversial issue of 'benefits tourism' is given little attention. However,
although not in great detail, the four candidates do affirm the importance of free movement for the EU clearly
distinguishing it from the immigration policy. Another point of consensus among candidates is the intention to allow
Romania and Bulgaria to enter the Schengen area, although this is an issue for some political parties such as the French
UMP. Furthermore, despite it being an important topic at national level, especially in France, the revision of the
Schengen rules is not envisaged by any of the four candidates. 
Two campaigns in one
Clearly, at present the European citizens – to the extent to which they follow the debates at EU level and/or at national
level – face two significantly different campaigns particularly regarding immigration and freedom of movement. 
On the one hand, the tone is significantly different as there are no right-wing populists involved in the debate for
Commission presidency, which allows a serene debate among the headline candidates. 
On the other hand, national and EU campaigns differ in the message they send. At national level, citizens are invited to
vote in order to choose representatives for the EP who, during the campaign, present purely national propositions in terms
of immigration and free movement. At EU level, citizens are told that they can select the future President of the European
Commission, but the plans the four candidates present in their campaigns related to these two policies have a more
European wide angle. All in all, and although this might not be exclusively limited to immigration and free movement
policies, this double discourse from politicians is very confusing for voters.
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PROSPECTS
It is difficult to define the consequences of such a scattered political landscape regarding the future agenda in the field
of immigration and freedom of movement. Clearly the two different debates have not influenced each other throughout
the campaign. It is therefore hard to determine which of the approaches will frame the next political agenda on
immigration and free movement. This will mainly depend on the future Commission President – whether they are one
of the top candidates put forward by the European parties or not – and the future composition of the EP. If extremist
parties score high, they might influence the political agenda more strongly, especially in the fields of immigration and
free movement as these policies are in the core of their political programmes.
In the medium run, what room for manoeuvre will the future Commission President have to ensure the implementation
of the programme promoted during the campaign? Although there is no clear answer to this question, several factors
will influence their capacity to stick to their 'promises':
• Heads of State and Government will at the June 2014 European Council, i.e. before the new Commission will have
entered office, define the strategic guidelines in the area of freedom, security and justice. Although none of the 
candidates mentioned these guidelines during the campaign, their duty is to define the orientations regarding the 
legislative and operational planning in these fields. As a consequence, the Commission's future agenda will be 
framed, or even limited. 
• Decisions taken under the previous legislature may also have an impact on the future Commission President's 
commitment to their campaign agenda. The multiannual financial framework 2014-2020 already sets – through the
allocated funds – certain priorities and actions to be taken by the next Commission. In addition, the Commission 
adopted two Communications in March 2014 – one by DG Justice and one by DG Home Affairs – which may also
act as a 'fil rouge' to follow and develop. 
• Finally, the profile of the future Commissioner/Commissioners in charge of immigration and freedom of movement 
is another key element. A highly complex political game will, at the end of the day, decide who gets this/these job(s).
As these fields are increasingly politicised, national governments are likely to attach great importance to these 
portfolios, and the nomination of the next Commissioner(s) will be strongly determined by EU governments. 
However, the European Parliament will also have a say as it did in 2004 when it rejected the nomination of Rocco 
Buttiglione for the Justice, Freedom and Security portfolio. All these factors will have an impact on the future 
priorities regarding immigration and freedom of movement.
Scope for a DG Citizenship and Mobility? 
Regardless of whose programme will prevail on the European agenda, who among the Commission Presidency
candidates – if any – will become Commission President, this new political cycle should be an opportunity for the next
head of the Commission to rethink the distribution of the immigration and free movement portfolios in the next college.
While none of the programmes presented by the four candidates envisaged this institutional aspect, a fundamentally
different Commission administrative structure is worth considering. Certainly, EU citizenship, freedom of movement
and immigration are separate and autonomous dossiers, but they are also interlinked if one thinks of immigration and
freedom of movement in terms of mobility of people to and within the EU. Hence, the idea of grouping them into one
big portfolio 'Citizenship and Mobility' (see Fabian Zuleeg, EPC Commentary, April 2014) – dealt with by a cluster of
Commissioners under the supervision of one Commission Vice-President – could have several advantages.
The new structure could lead to a more comprehensive approach of the challenges mobile people (EU citizens and
immigrants) face when entering and moving within the EU. Moreover, this new reorganisation would allow the EU
legislator to envisage a change of paradigm for the EU immigration policy and eliminate the remnants of the former
third pillar – placing the immigrant in the same basket as the drug dealer, the terrorist and other serious criminals. Now
that the third pillar is history in the Treaty, the EU can take the opportunity to change policy perceptions and reinforce
the protection pole of its immigration policy.
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